Community Energy Markets (CEMs) enable trading opportunities between participants 1 in a community to achieve savings and profits. However, the market design and the behaviour of 2 participants are key factors that determine the success of such markets. To this end, this research 3 presents a CEM model and conducts agent-based simulations to study the benefits of the CEM to 4 consumers and prosumers. The proposed market structure is an hour-ahead periodic double auction.
Clearing

201
At the end of each trading period, the clearing price and trading quantity or volume are calculated 202 based on market equilibrium matching using uniform pricing [40] . The market objective is to maximise 203 the equilibrium trading volume. There are typically two different types of goals when it comes to 204 auctions: maximising social welfare or maximising trading volume. Maximising volume would be 205 better for a community energy market because, in our proposed market, the private values of the 206 buyers and sellers which are required to compute social welfare are unknown. In addition, using a 207 uniform pricing approach, as in our model, we aim to trade as much energy as possible to reduce 208 energy exchanged with the grid. So, given the set of bids N B T for market a round T, where b i and d i 209 i ∈ N B T are the bid price and demand quantity respectively, (1) calculates the demand quantity for 
The facilitator is responsible for finding the auction clearing price P that maximises Q. If there are 214 two or more prices that achieve the same trading volume, this referred to as a buy-sell gap. In this 215 case, the clearing price P is then chosen in the middle between the minimum ask and maximum bid in 216 order not to favour suppliers in all situations, and to provide some benefits to consumers. Therefore, P 217 is the average of the set P returned by (4) as represented by (5).
Algorithm 1 shows the steps to compute the clearing price and the trading volume given N B T and 219 N A T . Moreover, Figure 2 shows an example clearing price alongside the corresponding supply and 220 demand curves. The shaded area refers to social welfare, which is the total utility of the buyers minus 221 the total cost of the sellers [41] . Although social welfare as defined in (6), assumes the knowledge of 222 the true demand and supply curves using the private sellers' cost (c) and buyers' marginal benefit (m), 223 in our setting, the submitted bids and asks are used to represent the supply and demand curves. Example of computed clearing price and trading volume for a market round. The bids and asks prices are always within the grid prices. The clearing price is in the middle of the buy-sell gap. Demand/supply at any price is the aggregate bids/asks that could be fulfilled using this price.The shaded area corresponds to social welfare using the bids and asks as the traders private values.
Allocation
225
After the clearing price and the trading volume are computed, the facilitator needs to distribute the 226 cleared energy among the winning agents. Sometimes demand from the winning buyers is more than 227 supply or vice versa. Therefore, an allocation mechanism is needed to distribute the cleared energy.The 228 adopted allocation approach is an envy-free division protocol [42] . To explain our motivation, let us 229 consider this more detailed description of the problem. First, once a clearing price is determined, the 230 clearing mechanism needs to determine a precise energy allocation, i.e. who supplies energy and 
Loop over the unique set of bid prices q ← Q(p)
Compute the volume for price p using (3) bidsQ ← bidsQ || (p, q)
Append price p and volume q to the bids list for p in [N A T .o] do Loop over the unique set of asks prices q ← Q(p) asksQ ← asksQ || (p, q)
Append price p and volume q to the asks list maxQbid ← max(bidsQ.q) Get the bid with max volume maxQask ← max(asksQ.q) Get the ask with max volume if maxQbid.q > maxQask.q then V ← maxQbid.q P ← maxQbid.p else if maxQbid.q < maxQask.q then V ← maxQask.q P ← maxQask.p else V ← maxQbid.q P ← (maxQbid.p + maxQask.p)/2 if V = 0 then return Null Return null if no trade can be done return P, V Return the clearing price and the trading volume whose demand is met. Buyers whose buy price is highest are matched with sellers whose price is 232 lowest. However, at the border where demand meets supply, there could be multiple agents who 233 have the same price. The problem is then choosing who should contribute and how many resources 234 should they contribute. The algorithm is based on a proportional selection but takes into account the 235 individual agent's constraints. For example, suppose that, at a price p = 5, there is demand of 9 units, 236 and a supply of 2, 5 and 10 units by agents 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Hence there is a demand of 9, but a 237 supply of 17. The question is: how to select who supplies energy and how many units. If we divide 238 these proportionally, then each agent would contribute 3. However, agent 1 can supply a maximum of 239 2 units at that price. Therefore, we have a preliminary allocation of 2,3,3, which equals 8 units. So there 240 is 1 unit left that needs to be allocated in a second round. Again we divide this proportionally between 241 the remaining agents (2 and 3), and they contribute 0.5 each. This is within their maximum supply, 242 so the algorithm stops, and the final allocation is: 2, 3.5, 3.5. This seems a natural way of dividing and preserve energy to be used when needed. Naturally, the difference between the allocated and exact 259 energy amounts should be reflected in the agents' final bills, which will be explained in Section 3.7.
260
However, first, an energy balancing method needs to be implemented to fulfil the community's energy 261 needs. The proposed balancing mechanism is a minute by minute approach. Before we discuss how 262 energy balancing is achieved, we need to consider the time differences between agents' allocated supply and demand, as it is not reasonable to assume that energy exchange in the hourly round will 264 overlap perfectly. This issue is depicted in Figure 3 . This condition creates an energy quantity that has 265 to be fulfilled by the grid, and for which no agent is responsible, as agents are only accountable for . An example of the imperfect overlap between a consumer and a supplier each allocated 2 kWh. In the first half-hour, no supply is available, so there is a shortage of 1 kWh. The supplier's entire 2 kWh is exported in the second half of the hour, which creates a surplus of 1 kWh. Assuming both agents do not have storage, the shortage and surplus have to be fulfilled by the grid. So, 1 kWh is imported at G b , and 1 kWh is exported at G s . This condition creates a net bill deficit because both agents demanded and supplied exactly their allocation, but some energy was exchanged with the grid to resolve the imperfect overlap.
We define three sources of energy used to satisfy the agents' energy needs which are inflexible 269 energy, flexible energy and the grid. Inflexible energy is the energy that needs to be fulfilled no matter 270 what, like an appliance's demand or excess solar energy with no storage which has to be exported.
271
The energy that is or could be charged or discharged from storage devices is referred to as flexible 272 energy. This energy is sometimes used to fulfil inflexible energy in order to avoid dealing with the 273 grid and to maintain the benefits within the community. The grid's energy is always considered as 274 the last resort if any needs cannot be satisfied by the other two types of energy. Therefore, to fully 275 utilise the energy within the community, the concept of demand and supply ability at a given minute 276 is introduced, representing the amounts agents can demand or supply in a given minute. For agents 277 without storage, the demand and supply abilities are the same as their exact needs in a given minute.
278
However, for agents with storage, their abilities change every minute depending on their needs and 279 their storage state. The formulas used to compute the demand and supply abilities will be explained 280 in Section 4.2. The proposed balancing method uses the demand and supply abilities to facilitate the 281 energy exchange of the allocated market amounts and resolve any imbalance. Energy can be exchanged 282 between agents outside the allocated market amounts within what is referred to as the secondary 283 market, which is explained next in Section 3.6.1. The algorithm for the balancing methodology is 284 shown in Algorithm 3. This algorithm treats agents with no storage devices as if they have storage 285 devices with zero capacity. This approach makes the implementation functional for agents with and 286 without storage. The algorithm uses some functions that will be presented in Section 4. The uncertainty in supply and demand creates secondary exchange opportunities between agents.
289
However, to avoid strategic behaviour, inflexible energy is exchanged at grid prices. So, instead of one 290 supplier exporting his energy at G s and the consumer importing it at G b , they exchange the energy 291 at those prices, and the community gets the profit instead of the grid. This profit is referred to as Algorithm 3 Balance Market Input agents list A, allocated demand dictionary for current round LD T , allocated supply dictionary for the current round LS T , minute t, current round cleared price P T and the community energy accounts accounts Output updated community accounts procedure BALANCEMARKET(agents, LD T , LS T , t, P, accounts) 
Update State
Exchange energy and update agents storage devices Update accounts with supplyShares, demandShares supplyShares2nd, demandShares2nd, gridImport, gridExport f lexibleDemand, f lexibleSupply, LD T , LS T a surplus in the community net bill, which is used to compensate for the deficit resulting from the 293 imperfect overlap between supply and demand discussed in Section 3.6. If the energy exchanged to distribute inflexible energy that needs to be fulfilled, which is solved using the envy-free division 312 presented in Section 3.5. A notable limitation to consider is the direction of energy. If a flexible agent 313 is supplying energy to fulfil his allocated market amounts, he cannot also demand energy from the 314 secondary market at the same minute. The flow of energy has to be one-way. So, if a flexible agent is 315 supplying to fulfil his allocated supply, he can only supply more energy to the secondary market in 316 the same minute. The same applies to the demand case. Section 3.7 will explain how the energy from 317 the primary and secondary markets are reflected in the agents' bills.
Accounting
319
The accounting function refers to the bill calculation method which determines the cost of energy 320 to consumers and the income from sold energy for suppliers. This accounting should be simple in 321 order to clearly communicate to the market players how their bills are calculated. The results from 322 the energy balancing are used in the accounting function with additional conditions. In the balancing 323 function, energy might be fulfilled by the grid because of the imperfect overlap between agents supply 324 and demand for which no agent is responsible. Yet, it is accounted in the community's net bill. So, 325 to calculate the agents' bills, the total energy for each agent at end of each round is calculated. For a 326 round T and an agent a, the sum of demand energy imported within the market allocation is denoted 327 as DM a T , and the demand imported within the secondary market as D2 a T , the demand imported from 328 the grid as GI a T , his flexible demand as DX a T and his allocated demand LD a T . We denote the supply 329 exported within the market allocation as SM a T , the supply exported within the secondary market as 330 S2 a T , the supply exported to the grid as GE a T , his flexible supply as SX a T and his allocated supply as 331 LS a T . Lastly, (7) and (8) calculate the total imported demand denoted as D a T and the total exported 332 supply denoted as S a T .
333
The market facilitator maintains energy amounts from the balancing algorithm and is responsible 334 for calculating all the bills at the end of each hour. A positive bill represents a cost, and a negative bill 335 represents an income. The bill calculation for inflexible energy is straightforward. If an agent consumes 336 or supplies what he was allocated in the round, he pays or receives the cleared market price P T for that 337 energy amount. For each kWh of excess demand, he pays G b , and for each kWh of excess supply, he 338 receives G s . When an agent consumes or supplies less than his allocation, he is penalised. The penalty 339 is needed because the difference is still provided by other agents who trade all their allocated amounts 340 using the cleared price. Besides, this charge is necessary to enforce the market allocations and prevent 341 agents from exaggerating their offer with no consequences. The demand shortage fee is denoted as 342 DF T and the supply shortage fee as SF T , which are defined in (9) and (10). (13), and the grid net bill, denoted as B G T is defined by (14). 356 Finally, a bill is defined for the community budget balance, which is the amount needed to balance all 357 agents net bills and the grid to zero. The community budget balance is referred to as the community 358 net bill, denoted as B C T and is represented by (15).The accounting algorithm to compute the hourly bills 359 is shown in Algorithm 4.
The accounting algorithm maintains the hourly bills for all agents in the facilitator's accounts 362 database. The next section will present the agents' energy prediction and their bidding strategy. 
Agent Trading Strategies
364
This section will explain the energy profiles in Section 4.1, followed by the energy prediction method 365 in Section 4.2, and concludes with the agents' bidding strategy in Section 4.3. renewable supply or a prosumer is assumed to always first self-consume this supply. So when n a i is 370 negative, this agent has already self-satisfied its demand and has more supply. Agents in this work predict their demand or supply based on past values using a look-back amount 373 denoted as k. So, for a given time t, the predicted energy n a t = n a t−k where t ∈ [0, .., T ]. If k is 0 and t 374 is in the future, this assumes the agent has complete knowledge of his future energy needs and can 375 predict his profile with perfect foresight. Although such perfection in prediction, in reality, is highly 376 unlikely, it is worth exploring and will be discussed in Section 5 in more details.
377
For an inflexible agent a ∈ A, the predicted energy demand, denoted as D a T , and the predicted energy supply, denoted as S a T , for a time interval T where the starting time in minutes is t s and the end time is t f , are represented by (16) and (17) respectively, where k is look-back amount in minutes used to compute n a t . 
Update accounts with bills used alongside the current SC a t to predict a new energy profile after using the energy storage. w a t is 382 calculated using (18).
It is worth noting that while calculating the energy profile w a t , at each t, the SC a t is updated 384 with the fulfilled amount from n a t . Similar to inflexible agents, the predicted demand and supply are 385 calculated via (16) and (17) but using w a t instead of n a t . These are the predicted inflexible demand and 386 supply, which cannot be fulfilled by the storage device.
387
Storage devices give flexible agents the ability to supply or demand more than they need. This ability allows these agents to sell or buy more if the price is suitable and to participate in the secondary market to fulfil their inflexible energy. First, flexible agents need to estimate how much demand or supply can they offer in the market. An agent's maximum demand and supply abilities are defined as the maximum amounts the storage device can charge or discharge at time t plus the agent's estimated net n a t . The flexible agents maximum demand for a time interval T with start time t s and finish t f and a look-back value k is defined by (19). The storage demand is reduced by the predicted excess energy which needs to be stored, or is added to the agent's demand. When n a t is positive, this means the agent has energy need that could either be fulfilled by the storage or by the market. However, if the storage fulfils this demand, then at this moment, the storage cannot charge because it is discharging to fulfil this energy need. Therefore, the storage demand ability at this moment is zero. In contrast, if the agent's need is added to the storage demand, the agent can request more from the market to cover his needs and store the rest. The second approach is implemented to maximise the potential energy stored. If n a t is negative, the agent can demand from the market the remaining in his charge power if available or zero.
Similarly, the maximum storage supply and for a time interval T is defined by (20). The storage supply is reduced by the predicted needed energy or is added to the agent's supply. When n a t is negative, this means the agent has an excess supply that could be stored or exported to the market. However, if this supply is stored, then at this moment, the storage cannot discharge because it is charging with the excess supply. Therefore, the storage supply ability at this moment is zero. In contrast, if the agent's supply is added to the storage supply, the agent can offer more to the market. If n a t is positive, the agents can offer the market the remaining in his discharge power if available or zero. Again, the second approach is implemented to maximise the potential energy offered to the market.
In computing the maximum demand ability and supply ability for a flexible agent At each t, a temporary SC a t is updated with the maximum charge or discharge amounts to be included in the calculation of t + 1. The maximum demand and supply in (19) and (20) contains both flexible and inflexible energy. Agents need to distinguish between them for bidding reasons. Therefore, flexible energy is calculated by subtracting inflexible energy from the maximum demand and supply.
The inflexible and flexible energy is priced differently, which is explained next in Section 4.3.
Bidding Strategy
389
The two grid prices G b and G s play an important role in the trading strategy. There is no reason 390 for an agent to exchange energy within the community market at prices worse than the grid prices.
391
Therefore, the maximum possible market price is G b , and the minimum possible price is G s . Since 392 consumers are inflexible (i.e. they need to satisfy demand), we assume they are always prepared to However, when prosumers have storage, they can offer different prices for both demand and 398 supply. They can buy energy when supply is ample and sell it back when demand is higher. This is an 399 essential element of the proposed market to create a profit opportunity for prosumers with storage.
400
So, flexible agents can choose prices for SX T or DX T within the limits of the grid prices. No agent is 401 allowed to sell energy at a lower price than G s or buy at a higher price that than G b .
402
Due to the complexity of the market model, a simple bidding strategy for flexible agents is implemented. The strategy is based on multiple parameters. The first one is the predicted price for the next market round denoted as P T+1 . The prediction is performed by averaging the previously announced prices for the same round from past days. So, given the set of announced market prices H T i i ∈ [T − 24, T − 48, .., 0] and a size of the set M T for a market round T, (23) represents the predicted price for the next round P T+1 . If no market announcements exist for the next round, the predicted price is chosen halfway between the grid prices. To avoid having all agents adopt the same price prediction, a random noise , drawn from a standard uniform distribution with a minimum of -1 and a maximum of 1 is added to the predicted price. In summary, agents use the previously announced market prices to predict the price for the next round. is a random noise to introduce variance in the bidding strategy as all agents adopt the same strategy. The range (-1,1) is chosen because the price range between the gird prices is 5 in our simulations, and 20% of that range is 1, which is a reasonable variance.
The rationale behind predicting the price for the next market round is that agents can assume that 403 if they do not sell their energy at the current round, they can sell it in the next round at P T+1 . So, P T+1 404 is the minimum asking price for the current round. The same applies to the demand, but instead of 405 selling, agents assume they can buy it in the next round at P T+1 . So, P T+1 is the maximum bidding 406 price for the current round.
407
Another vital parameter in the bidding method is the gap between the selling and buying prices 408 that flexible agents adopt. This gap is denoted as ∆. Agents adopt an increasing function for their 409 flexible supply quantity SX T . They start at a price of P T+1 + ∆ 2 and increase it by an increment price z 410 for each additional unit u that can be offered up to the maximum price of G b − y. When the maximum 411 price is reached, all the remaining quantity of SX T is offered at this maximum price even if it exceeds u.
412
In the case of flexible demand quantity DX T , the price function is a decreasing function where agents 413 start with the P T+1 − ∆ 2 and decrease the price by z for each additional unit u demanded down to the 414 minimum price of G s + y. Similarly, any reaming DX T is offered at the minimum price. Algorithm 5 415 shows the function used by agents to price their flexible energy using the mentioned parameters.
416 Figure 4 provides an example quantity pricing for an agent with 5 kWh of DX T and 5 kWh of SX T .
417
With this methodology, flexible agents participate in the market by providing their offers. The next 418 section will present the agent-based market simulations.
Algorithm 5 Quantity Pricing
Input the estimated price for the next round P T+1 , the gap between the selling and buying prices ∆, price changing unit z quantity changing unit u, price of buying energy form the grid G b ,price of selling energy to the grid G s , flexible demand quantity DX T , flexible supply quantity SX T Output lists of bids and asks bids, asks
append quantity and price to bids list DX T ← 0 else bids ← bids || (min(DX T , u), minBid + priceSpace) DX T ← max(0, DX T − u) priceSpace ← max(0, priceSpace − z) if SX T > 0 then priceSpace ← maxAsk − minAsk while SX T > 0 do if priceSpace = 0 then asks ← asks || (SX T , maxAsk) append quantity and price to asks list . Asks and bids for 5 kWh of flexible energy in both supply and demand. The next round predicted price P T+1 at this instance is halfway between G b and G s . The price gap ∆ is set to 1 pence, the quantity u is set to 1 kWh, the price changing rate z is set to 0.5 pence and the price distance from the grid prices y is set to 0.25 pence. This agent submitted 5 bids and 5 asks for each with 1 kWh.
Simulations
420
In order to empirically validate the market mechanisms and agents proposed in earlier sections, we profit, denoted as SP T , and represented by (25). When DS T or SP T is negative indicates demand cost 449 or supply income at this round is worse compared to the existence of no market.
The community net bill B C T defined in Section 3.7 is another measure considered. If B C T is positive, 451 a deficit exists in the budget and cost needs to be paid by the community as a whole. If B C T is negative, 452 a surplus exists in the budget and profit needs to be shared. The mechanism of distributing the 453 community budget deficit or surplus is beyond the scope of this research, so only the net budget bill is 454 reported.
455
In some cases, the fees from demand and supply shortage could result in agent bills that are 456 worse than not being in the market. For example, let say an agent is allocated 5 kWh at the price of 457 6 pence/kWh, the agent then only uses 1 kWh. It is therefore charged a shortage fee of 4 · DF T = 458 4(6 − 3.41) which is 10.36. It pays this fee plus the 6 pence he pays for the 1 kWh which totals to 16.36 459 pence. On the other hand, importing 1 kWh from the grid with no market costs 8.3 pence. So, this agent 460 does not make any savings, and in fact, pays more for his energy compared to not participating in the 461 market. Therefore, we introduce a notion of capped bills where the agent never pays more than the 462 cost to import its true demand without participating in the market. Similarly, the agent never receives 463 less than the income to export its true supply without participating in the market. The concept of the 464 capped bill is adopted to avoid resulting in higher energy costs or profit compared to not participating 465 in the CEM. In other words, agents are always at least as well off participating and never worse off.
466
To this end, we compare what the cost would have been using the (fixed) grid prices. Note that we 467 consider the caps ex-post, i.e. based on the actual consumption and/or production and so there is no 468 uncertainty to consider here.
469
Equation (26) and SP a T are defined in (28) and (29). The capped measures are important to note here as they will be 472 discussed in more details under the imperfect predictions simulations Section 6.2.
Finally, the aggregate measure for a day K is the sum of all measures for rounds T where T ∈ K. Equations (30), (31), (32), (33), (34) and (35) define the aggregate uncapped and capped measures. The average daily aggregate measures and the aggregate measures for the entire simulations period will be compared in each setting presented in Section 6. show that with perfect predictions, B C K is in a deficit state. This deficit exists because no energy is traded in the secondary market to create profit that compensates for the supply-demand overlap 499 deficit. Figure 5 shows the daily average B C K with increasing prosumer ratio. With a prosumer ratio of 500 zero, no deficit exists as there is no market. With a prosumer ratio of 20%, the deficit is insignificant 501 because the energy traded is small since only 10 prosumers with 2 kW solar array can supply energy, 502 and the demand is far greater. However, as energy traded becomes large enough, the deficit becomes 503 significant at around £0.65 per day on average. Average Daily Community Net Bill Figure 5 . Daily average B C K for the simulations with perfect predictions without storage. A deficit exists a result of the imperfect overlap between supply and demand. The deficit is noticeable with a prosumer ratio of 40% and higher as more energy is traded within the market. The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Figure 6 shows a comparison between the average daily SP K and DS K . Both are equal because the 505 energy price in this setting is always at the mid-price between the grid prices. The mid-price is a result 506 of all agents being inflexible, and therefore, not able to bid or ask different prices. are prosumers with an aggregate max PV power of 50 kW. Similar to the simulations in the previous 514 setting without storage, the simulations with storage show that with perfect predictions, B C K is in a 515 deficit state. This is expected as no energy is traded in the secondary market to compensate for the 516 deficit. However, the deficit is reduced with the introduction of storage. Compared to the market 517 with 40% prosumer ratio and without storage where the average daily B C K is around £0.75 per day,
518
introducing 20% storage ratio among the prosumers with 3 kWh storage devices, reduces the average 519 daily B C K to around £0.6 per day. Furthermore, increasing the storage ratio or the capacity also reduces 520 the average daily B C K as seen in Figure 7 . This reduction is due to the flexible agents' ability to preserve 521 energy and discharge it when it is needed by the market, rather than having the randomised supply 522 control when energy is exported to the market. The distribution of financial benefits in this setting shows that the average daily SP K is more 524 significant than DS K . This shift is because flexible agents trade their energy at high prices to maximise 525 their profit as seen in Figure 8 . Moreover, Figure 8 (a) shows that as more prosumers become flexible, 526 DS K is reduced because less inflexible supply is offered at the low price of G s . Also, increasing the 527 storage capacity has the same effect of lowering the inflexible energy. Figure 8(b) shows that having 10 528 kWh storage devices with all prosumers results in the most substantial average daily SP K and the least 529 DS K at the same time.
530 Table 3 compares the measures for this setting for the entire period M. It shows that introducing 531 storage increases the sum of DS M and SP M , with SP M as the significant portion. Also, as the ratio of 532 prosumers with storage increases, the share of SP M in the sum increases as well. In the same setting 533 with 40% prosumers but without storage, the sum of both DS M and SP M is around £203 with 50% 534 for SP M . Equipping 20% of the prosumers with 3 kWh storage devices results in increasing the sum Figure 8 . Average daily DS K and SP K for the setting with perfect predictions with storage. The average SP K is more than DS K because flexible agents raise the trading price to gain more profit. That is why as storage ratio increases, SP K increases as well because prosumers have more flexible energy to offer at higher prices, which also decreases DS K . The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
to £236, which is a 16% increase with SP M , making 60% of the sum. The market with 40% of the 536 prosumers having 10 kWh capacity storage devices, has the most significant sum of £302, which is a 537 48% increase from the setting without storage, with SP M making 77% of the sum. This setting with 538 storage shows that suppliers are benefiting more compared to without storage, which is anticipated, 539 given their flexible ability and bidding strategy. To provide a further comparison, Table 3 Figure 10 shows a comparison between the average daily DS K and SP K , and the average daily 560 DS K and SP K . Increasing the prosumer ratio reduces the average daily DS K until it becomes negative 561 with 100% prosumers as seen in Figure 10(a) . This behaviour is a sign that demand in a market with 562 100% prosumers under the uncapped approach, is slightly more expensive compared to no market.
563
This is because demand shortage fees become more significant as increasing the prosumer ratio means 564 fewer consumers, which reduces the overall market demand. Another reason is the higher uncertainty as well as it increases the flexible agents' ability to offer supply in the market. Figure 13 shows both 593 average daily SP K and SP K . The differences between them are insignificant because of high trading Figure 13 . Comparison between average daily SP K and SP K . Increasing the storage ratio and capacity increase both profits. The reduction from the uncapped bill approach is still present. However, it is insignificant due to high supply profit and low supply shortage fees as more prosumers become flexible. The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Table 5 . Comparison between capped and uncapped measures for the setting with imperfect predictions with storage for M in £. Both B C M and B C M are in a surplus states. However, increasing the storage ratio or the capacity decreases DS M until it becomes negative as highlighted in the red cells. The capped approach maintains a community surplus and results in higher DS M and SP M . The ratio of SP M in the benefits sum increase form 54% without storage to 66%-96%. storage adopt a simple bidding strategy with an increasing price function for supply and a decreasing 609 price function for demand. The bidding strategy maximises their profit under constrains on price 610 increments and quantities. The market cleared energy is allocated using the envy-free division protocol.
611
The model uses a minute by minute energy balancing approach that fulfils energy within the allocated 612 amounts or a secondary exchange opportunity where agents with storage can capitalise, or lastly by 613 the grid. The proposed billing method charges the grid prices for any excess energy and enforces the 614 auction allocations using shortage fees to discourage agents from exaggerating their offers. The billing 615 method also rewards agents with storage for any energy exchanged within the secondary market.
616
Considering the minute by minute energy balancing, this research shows that the imperfect 617 overlap between supply and demand creates a deficit in the community net bill. This deficit is reduced through the proposed secondary market, capitalising on uncertainty in future energy predictions.
619
The proposed billing method also reduces the deficit by collecting portions of the shortage fees 620 from both demand and supply at the same time when less energy is exchanged with the grid. The 621 disadvantage of this method is that it can result in overpriced demand when uncapped. However, financial benefits towards suppliers. The average aggregate daily supply profit increases from £2.3 669 without storage, to £8 when all prosumers have 10 kWh storage devices. In contrast, the average 670 aggregate daily demand savings decreases from £1.9 without storage, to £0.4 when all prosumers have 671 10 kWh storage devices. Moreover, the ratio of supply in the total community benefits increases from
